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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) with weak coherent
sources has been widely and meticulously analyzed. However, the analysis for MDI-QKD with
spontaneous parametric-down-conversion sources (SPDCS) is incomplete. In this paper, we pro-
pose two passive decoy protocols suitable for parameter estimation in MDI-QKD using SPDCS. By
accounting for practical parameters of SPDCS with thermal distribution, we present an investiga-
tion on the performances of MDI-QKD under the active three-intensity decoy protocol, the passive
two-intensity decoy protocol and the modified passive three-intensity protocol respectively. Phase
randomization, inherently prerequisite for decoy protocol, is taken into consideration for evaluating
the overall quantum bit gain and quantum bit error rate. The numerical simulations show that the
MDI-QKD using SPDCS with practical decoy protocols can be demonstrated comparable to the
asymptotical case and has apparent superiority both in transmission distance and key generation
rate compared to the one using weak coherent sources. Our results also indicate that the modi-
fied passive three-intensity decoy protocol can perform better than the active three-intensity decoy
protocol in MDI-QKD using practical SPDCS.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.65.Yz, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an art to make
sure that the two legal communication parties can share
the same key based on quantum mechanics. QKD has
achieved great development both in theory and experi-
ment [1–6] since Bennett and Brassard presented the first
QKD protocol, BB84 protocol [7]. The ideal QKD has
been theoretically proved to be unconditionally secure in
different ways [8–14], no matter how great the compu-
tation power and storage space the eavesdropper owns.
However, practical QKD system undoubtedly exists sorts
of imperfections. In fact, unconditional security of QKD
never implies there is no restriction on the security in real
situation. It holds under three important assumptions
[15], i.e., quantum mechanics are correct, authentication
of classical communication is secure and all devices are
believable. Some loopholes due to imperfections of se-
tups will open windows for the Eve to acquire the secret
key. Just because of this, some quantum hacking strate-
gies have been subtly derived and successfully attacked
the practical QKD system, such as time-shift attack [16],
detector-blinding attack [17], wavelength-dependent at-
tack [18], and so on [19–22].
Some countermeasures have been proposed to over-
come these attacks. One approach is to derive efficient
mathematical model to characterize the properties of de-
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vices and take imperfect factors into account in security
proof as comprehensively as possible [15]. But from the
angle of philosophy, it will be difficult to implement on
a practical level. Another way is to employ the device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) [23, 24], in which the se-
curity is based on the violation of a Bell inequality [25]
without knowing the specifications of the devices used.
However, it inherently requires a high detection efficiency
to overcome the security loophole, which is hardly to
achieve for practical single photon detectors, leading di-
rectly to a extremely low key rate at practical distances
[26]. Thus, people begins to look for feasible schemes for
QKD that are intermediate between standard (device-
dependent) QKD and DI-QKD [27–30].
Measurement-device independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
scheme is recently proposed by Lo et al [29], in which
Alice and Bob both send photons to an untrusted
third party who can even be an eavesdropper, say Eve.
Eve performs a partial Bell-state measurement and an-
nounces the results to Alice and Bob for distilling a secret
key. In MDI-QKD, the detection system can be consid-
ered as an oracle with input and output trusted, but
no matter what has happened within it. Thus, MDI-
QKD can remove all detector side channels, of which
the security is guaranteed by the entanglement swapping
techniques and reverse Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
schemes [30]. Once MDI-QKD has been put forward,
some modified schemes have been proposed [31, 32]
and several experimental demonstrations have been per-
formed [33–36].
Note the fact that the sources of MDI-QKD should
be trusted, a complete characterization of the source is
indispensable. The weak coherent source is commonly
used as a replacement of the perfect single photon source.
2However, like the standard QKD, the MDI-QKD with
weak coherent sources is also vulnerable to the photon-
number-splitting attack due to the multi-photon frac-
tion [37]. Fortunately, the decoy-state method [38–40]
can be sufficiently applied to against this attack. More
importantly, it can be used as a tool to efficiently es-
timate the contribution of the single-photon pulse. In
Lo et al.’s seminal paper [29], the ideal infinite decoy-
state protocol is conducted to evaluate the contribution
of the single-photon pulse. But their result is almost im-
possible to be realized in real situations because of the
limited source. Later, some practical decoy-state proto-
cols and their improvements have been proposed by many
researchers combining such as finite-size effect, basis de-
pendent imperfection or quantum memories [41–46]. But
most of these results are based on weak coherent source
(WCS) except for the three-intensity decoy-state method
proposed by Wang [44]. For another candidate of photon
sources within reach of current technology, i.e., the con-
ditional generation of single photons based on parametric
down-conversion [47–49], the performance of decoy-state
MDI-QKD remains an issue of common concern.
Recently, we notice that Wang et al. [50] derived a
formula for estimating the single-photon contribution for
the MDI-QKD with Poisson distributed heralded sin-
gle photon source (HSPS). However, in this paper, we
will analyze the case when the spontaneous parametric-
down-conversion sources (SPDCS) under a practical pho-
ton number distribution (PND) are used in MDI-QKD.
Here, the PND is determined by a SPDCS with a thresh-
old detector. Just simply considering the PND when
threshold detector is triggered, we can apply the ac-
tive three-intensity decoy-state protocol to estimate the
single-photon’s contribution. While also taking the non-
triggered PND into account, the passive decoy state pro-
tocol originally proposed by Adachi et al. is conducted
[51]. Note that full phase randomization of each indi-
vidual pulse is a crucial assumption in security proofs of
decoy state QKD and active phase randomization is im-
plemented to protect against attacks on imperfect sources
in recent experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD[36].
Thus, differing from the analysis of Wang et al. [50],
our evaluations for the overall gain and quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) are based on full phase randomization,
which is internally demanded for decoy-state method. So
our formulas for the overall gain and QBER are more
stringent.
In this paper, inspired from the passive decoy-state
method presented by Adachi et al.[51], we raise two pas-
sive decoy protocols, the passive two-intensity decoy pro-
tocol and the modified passive three-intensity decoy pro-
tocol, which can be applied in MDI-QKD using SPDCS
with threshold detectors. Taking the phase-encoded
scheme proposed by Ma et al. for an example[32], we
analyze the performances of MDI-QKD with practical
SPDCS when different decoy protocols are conducted.
Numerical simulations show that the MDI-QKD using
SPDCS has apparent superiority both in transmission
distance and key generation rate compared to the one
using weak coherent sources. Moreover, both of the mod-
ified passive three-intensity decoy protocol and active
three-intensity decoy protocol[44] can be demonstrated
comparable to the asymptotical case when active infinite
decoy states are used. Our results also indicate the mod-
ified passive three-intensity decoy protocol can perform
better than the active three-intensity decoy protocol in
MDI-QKD using SPDCS with a practical photon number
distribution. The rest of paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we shall briefly review the SPDCS with practical
photon number distribution. The formulas for calculat-
ing the single-photon yield and error rate using active
three-intensity decoy protocol are introduced in Sec. III.
We derive the formulas for the passive two-intensity de-
coy protocol and modified passive three-intensity decoy
protocol respectively in Sec. IV and Sec. V. We perform
numerical simulations in Sec. VI, followed by a statistical
fluctuation analysis in Sec. VII. We conclude the paper
in Sec. VIII.
II. PRACTICAL SPONTANEOUS
PARAMETRIC-DOWN-CONVERSION SOURCE
As to our knowledge, spontaneous parametric-down-
conversion (SPDC) processes are widely used as the
sources in QKD such as the triggered or heralded single-
photon source[51, 52], and the entanglement source[53,
55]. Up to now, there exist some promising imple-
mentation demonstrations of QKD based on SPDC
processes[53–55]. In this paper, as is shown in Fig.1, we
consider the case when SPDC processes are used as trig-
gered single-photon sources in phase-encoded MDI-QKD
scheme proposed by Ma et al.[32](other experimental
schemes like the original polarization-based protocol[29]
and the phase-encoded protocol proposed by Tamaki
et.al[31] are also feasible). We remark that the security
of scheme shown in Fig.1 relies on detectors DA and DB
to be trusted, which maybe introduce side channel attack
if the laboratories are untrusted[56]. However, this type
of attacks can be avoided if Alice and Bob have secret
area respectively.
The two identical sources with sub-Poissonian distribu-
tion are emitted from non-degenerate SPDC process[47].
This type of SPDC processes creates the two-mode state
(coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)
n
einθ |n, n〉 (1)
Suppose the intensity µ of the source to be sinh2 χ, then
the above description simplifies to
∞∑
n=0
√
µn
(1+µ)n+1
einθ |n, n〉 (2)
When Alice(Bob) monitors one mode of her(his) SPDC
source with a practical threshold detector described by
detection efficiency ηA(ηB) and dark count rate dA(dB),
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FIG. 1: The schematic diagram of the phase-encoded MDI-
QKD protocol using triggered single-photon sources based on
SPDC processes. Here, PDC represents the non-degenerate
SPDC process, BS stands for 50:50 beam splitter and PM
stands for the phase modulator. DA andDB are the threshold
detectors used for triggering signal pulses, r0, r1, s0 and s1
are the four single-photon detectors for performing Bell state
measurement.
Alice’s(Bob’s) other mode changes to a mixed state un-
der the condition that the detector has been successfully
triggered. This state can be described as[54, 57]
|ψ(µA, θA) 〉A =
√
P corµA
1+µA
· dA
PpostµA
+ (1− P corµA ) |0〉
+
∞∑
n=1
√
P corµA · µA
n
(1+µA)
n+1 · 1−(1−ηA)
n+dA
PpostµA
einθA |n〉,
(3)
|ψ(µB, θB) 〉B =
√
P corµB
1+µB
· dB
PpostµB
+ (1− P corµB ) |0〉
+
∞∑
n=1
√
P corµB · µB
n
(1+µB)
n+1 · 1−(1−ηB)
n+dB
PpostµB
einθB |n〉
(4)
where µA(µB) is the mean photon number of Alice’s
(Bob’s) one mode before triggering, P postµA = 1 + dA −
1
1+µAηA
(P postµB = 1 + dB − 11+µBηB ) denotes the post-
selection probability, and P corµA (P
cor
µB ) is the correlation
rate of photon pairs for Alice’s(Bob’s) source with inten-
sity of µA(µB), i.e. the probability that one can predict
the existence of a heralded photon given a triggered one.
After phase randomization(integrating θ over [0, 2π]), Al-
ice and Bob’s heralded mixed state shown as Eq.(3)and
Eq.(4) can be described by the following photon number
distribution
Pn(µx) =


1− P corµx +
dxP
cor
µx
(1+µx)P
post
µx
for n = 0
µnx [1−(1−ηx)n+dx]P corµx
(1+µx)n+1P
post
µx
for n ≥ 1
(5)
where x = A(x = B) denotes the case of triggered state
output from Alice(Bob).
III. ACTIVE THREE-INTENSITY
DECOY-STATE PROTOCOL
Once the two-pulse state from Alice and Bob’s SPDCS
arrives at the relay(controlled by an untrusted eaves-
dropper Eve)for detection, Eve will announce whether
the two-pulse state has caused a successful Bell state
measurement according to the detection results. Those
states corresponding to successful measurement events
at the relay will be post selected as the sifted keys and
be input to the postprocessing procedure. The most
key point is how to estimate the single-photon contribu-
tions and errors based on practical experiments. Luckily,
the three-intensity decoy-state protocol for MDI-QKD re-
cently proposed by Wang[44] can be introduced for this
purpose. In this protocol, Alice(Bob) need to actively
and randomly modulate her(his) sources to prepare dif-
ferent states with intensity of 0,µA and µ
′
A(0,µB and µ
′
B).
Here, µ′A(µ
′
B) is the intensity of signal state, 0 is the in-
tensity of vacuum states, µA(µB)is the intensity of decoy
state and µ′A > µA(µ
′
B > µB). According to Wang’s the-
ory, if
P1(µ
′
A)P2(µ
′
B)
P1(µA)P2(µB)
≤ P2(µ′A)P1(µ′B)P2(µA)P1(µB) holds true, the low
bound of successful single-photon counting rate in the Z
basis and upper bound of single-photon error rate in the
X basis can be estimated by[44]
Y Z11 ≥
P1(µ
′
A)P2(µ
′
B)(QµAµB−Q0)−P1(µA)P2(µB)(Qµ′Aµ′B−Q
′
0)
P1(µ′A)P1(µA)[P2(µ
′
B)P1(µB)−P2(µB)P1(µ′B)]
(6)
EX11 ≤
EXµAµB
QXµAµB
−P0(µA)EX0µBQ
X
0µB
−P0(µB)EXµA0Q
X
µA0
P1(µA)P1(µB)Y X11
+P0(µA)P0(µB)E00Y00
P1(µA)P1(µB)Y X11
(7)
Here, QµAµB (Qµ′Aµ′B ) denotes the overall gain when the
intensity of Alice’s source is µA(µ
′
A) and that of Bob’s
source is µB(µ
′
B), Q0 = P0(µA)Q0µB + P0(µB)QµA0 −
P0(µA)P0(µB)Y00, Q
′
0 = P0(µ
′
A)Q0µ′B + P0(µ
′
B)Qµ′A0 −
P0(µ
′
A)P0(µ
′
B)Y00, Q0µB , QµA0, Q0µ′B and Qµ′A0 are the
overall gain under different sources where 0 represents
that the intensity of the corresponding source is vacuum;
Y00 is the yield of a background noise; Q
X
µAµB , Q
X
0µB and
QXµA0 is the overall gain in the X basis under different
sources ; EXµAµB , E
X
0µB and E
X
µA0 is the overall quantum
bit error rate of events in the X basis under different
sources ; E00 = 1/2 is the error rate of a random noise.
Thus, the key rate for the active three intensity decoy-
state protocol can be given by[44]
R = P1(µ
′
A)P1(µ
′
B)Y
Z
11(1−H(EX11))
−QZµ′
A
µ′
B
f(EZµ′
A
µ′
B
)H(EZµ′
A
µ′
B
). (8)
where H(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1−x)log2(1−x) denotes the
binary Shannon entropy function, QZµ′Aµ′B
and EZµ′Aµ′B
are
the overall gain and error rate in the Z basis under source
of µ′Aµ
′
B . f(x) is the error correction efficiency.
IV. PASSIVE TWO-INTENSITY DECOY-STATE
PROTOCOL
Active decoy-state protocol typically needs a variable
optical attenuator (VOA) in signal sender’s side to inde-
pendently and randomly vary the intensity of each signal
4state. However, in some scenarios, if the VOA is not cor-
rectly designed, it may occur that some physical param-
eters of the sending pulses rely on the particular setting
selected [58], which could bring threat to the security of
the active schemes. Therefore passive preparation of in-
tensity might be practically desirable to some extent [59].
In [51], Adachi et al. present an efficient passive decoy-
state proposal for the QKD based on SPDCS, where only
a simple threshold detector is used. Later, Ma and Lo
[56] combined the results of [51] and [59] to the most
common case. In 2009, Curty et al. [60] generalized the
passive decoy idea and proposed a new scheme for the
case when weak coherent source is used. Here, inspiring
from the idea proposed by Adachi et al. [51], we shall
apply the passive decoy protocol to the MDI-QKD using
SPDCS. The experimental setup, as is shown in Fig.1,
is kept unchanged as the active three intensity decoy-
state protocol, except keeping the detectors in the relay
to work no matter whether there is a trigger signal or not
in Alice and Bob’s threshold detectors. Therefore, the
non-triggered events, acting as the role of decoy states,
can be used to estimate the single-photon contribution.
In this case, the signal n-photon events can be divided
into two parts, the triggered events with probability of
PTn (µx) and the non-triggered events with probability of
PNTn (µx)
PTn (µx) =
{ 1−P corµx
2 +
P corµx dx
(1+µx)
for n = 0
µnx [1−(1−ηx)n+dx]P corµx
(1+µx)n+1
for n ≥ 1
(9)
PNTn (µx) =
{ 1−P corµx
2 +
P corµx (1−dx)
(1+µx)
for n = 0
µnx [(1−ηx)n−dx]P corµx
(1+µx)n+1
for n ≥ 1
(10)
where x = A or x = B. If we consider the above photon
number distribution shown in Eq.(9) and Eq.(10), the
corresponding overall counting rates of triggered events
and non-triggered events can be expressed as
Q
(t)
µAµB =
∞∑
n=0,m=0
Q
(t)
nm
= Q
(t)
µA0
+Q
(t)
0µB
−Q(t)00 +Q(t)11
+
∞∑
m=2
Q
(t)
1m +
∞∑
n=2
Q
(t)
n1 +
∞∑
n=2,m=2
Q
(t)
nm
(11)
Q
(nt)
µAµB =
∞∑
n=0,m=0
Q
(nt)
nm
= Q
(nt)
µA0
+Q
(nt)
0µB
−Q(nt)00 +Q(nt)11
+
∞∑
m=2
Q
(nt)
1m +
∞∑
n=2
Q
(nt)
n1 +
∞∑
n=2,m=2
Q
(nt)
nm
(12)
where Q
(t)
nm = YnmP
T
n (µA)P
T
m(µB) is the triggered gain
when Alice sends n-photon pulse and Bob sends m-
photon pulse, Q
(nt)
nm = YnmP
NT
n (µA)P
NT
m (µB) is the
non-triggered gain when Alice sends n-photon pulse
and Bob sends m-photon pulse, Q
(t)
µA0
is the triggered
overall gain when the intensity of Alice’s source is
µA and that of Bob’s source is 0. The meaning of
Q
(t)
0µB
, Q
(nt)
µA0
and Q
(nt)
0µB
is similar to Q
(t)
µA0
, Q
(t)
00 =
PT0 (µA)P
T
0 (µB)Y00 and Q
(nt)
00 = P
NT
0 (µA)P
NT
0 (µB)Y00
are the gains from background noises. Define rnm =
rnrm where rn =
PTn (µA)
PNTn (µA)
and rm =
PTm(µB)
PNTm (µB)
, then
Q
(t)
nm = rnmQ
(nt)
nm . From a mathematical analysis, we
can obtain that 0 < r0 < r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · .
Thus, it is obvious that rnm < min{rn(m+1), r(n+1)m} ≤
max{rn(m+1), r(n+1)m} < r(n+1)(m+1) for n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1.
Define rmin = min(r12, r21), then rminQ
(nt)
nm ≤ Q(t)nm
for n,m ≥ 1. Applying Eq.(11) and Eq.(12) leads to
rmin[Q
(nt)
µAµB −Q(nt)µA0 −Q
(nt)
0µB
+Q
(nt)
00 −Q(nt)11 ] ≤ Q(t)µAµB −
Q
(t)
µA0
− Q(t)0µB + r00Q
(nt)
00 − r11Q(nt)11 , we thus obtain the
minimum value of Q
(nt)
11 as a function of the parameter
α ≡ Q
(nt)
00
Q
(nt)
µAµB
:
Q
(nt)
11
Q
(nt)
µAµB
≥ (rmin−r00)α+rminQ
(nt)
∆ −Q
(t)
∆
rmin−r11 , ξ(α), (13)
where Q
(nt)
∆ =
Q(nt)µAµB
−Q(nt)µA0−Q
(nt)
0µB
Q
(nt)
µAµB
and Q
(t)
∆ =
Q(t)µAµB
−Q(t)µA0−Q
(t)
0µB
Q
(nt)
µAµB
.
Note that the overall quantum bit error rates
of triggered and non-triggered events are calcu-
lated by E
(t)
µAµB =
∞∑
n=0,m=0
Q(t)nmEnm
Q
(t)
µAµB
and E
(nt)
µAµB =
∞∑
n=0,m=0
Q(nt)nm Enm
Q
(nt)
µAµB
, we can also get the upper bound of
e11 as
e11 ≤ E
(t)
∆ +αr00E00
r11ξ(α)
, ǫt(α) (14)
where E
(t)
∆ =
Q(t)µAµB
E(t)µAµB
−Q(t)µA0E
(t)
µA0
−Q(t)0µBE
(t)
0µB
Q
(nt)
µAµB
and
E00 = 1/2 is the error rate of a random noise.
In a similar way, we have another bound
e11 ≤ E
(nt)
∆ +αE00
ξ(α) , ǫnt(α) (15)
where E
(nt)
∆ =
Q(nt)µAµB
E(nt)µAµB
−Q(nt)µA0E
(nt)
µA0
−Q(nt)0µBE
(nt)
0µB
Q
(nt)
µAµB
.
Combining these two upper bounds, we have
e11 ≤ min{ǫt(α), ǫnt(α)} , ǫ(α) (16)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ min{ 2Q
(t)
µAµB
E(t)µAµB
r00Q
(nt)
µAµB
, 2E
(nt)
µAµB}.
Consequently, the key rate from the triggered events
can be given by
R(t) = Q
(nt)
µAµB min
α=0
{r00α+ r11ξ(α)[1 −H(ǫ(α))]}
−Q(t)µAµBf(E(t)µAµB )H(E(t)µAµB ),
(17)
5and the key rate from both the triggered and non-
triggered events is given by
R(both)
= Q
(nt)
µAµB min
α=0
{(1 + r00)α+ (1 + r11)ξ(α)[1 −H(ǫ(α))]}
−Q(t)µAµBf(E(t)µAµB )H(E(t)µAµB )
−Q(nt)µAµBf(E(nt)µAµB )H(E(nt)µAµB ).
(18)
Therefore, the final key rate of the passive one intensity
decoy-state protocol is given by
R = max{R(t), R(both)}. (19)
V. MODIFIED PASSIVE THREE-INTENSITY
DECOY-STATE PROTOCOL
For the active three-intensity decoy-state protocol, the
basic assumption is that the yield of decoy states is equal
to that of signal states, i.e., Ynm = Y
′
nm for n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1.
And for the passive two-intensity decoy-state protocol,
the assumption is that the yield of triggered states is
equal to that of non-triggered states, i.e., Y Tnm = Y
NT
nm
for n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1. Similarly, considering the case when
active decoy states are used in passive decoy protocol,
we can also assume that the yield of triggered decoy
states is equal to that of non-triggered signal states, i.e.,
Y Tnm = Y
′NT
nm for n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1. Based on this assump-
tion, we improve the passive two-intensity decoy-state
protocol and propose a new protocol called modified pas-
sive three-intensity decoy-state protocol.
In our new protocol, Alice(Bob) also need to actively
and randomly modulate her(his) sources to prepare dif-
ferent states with intensity of 0,µA and µ
′
A(0,µB and µ
′
B).
Here, µ′A(µ
′
B) is the intensity of signal states, 0 is the in-
tensity of vacuum states, µA(µB)is the intensity of decoy
states and µ′A > µA(µ
′
B > µB). The set of signal states
is divided into two parts, one part is the set of triggered
signal states and the other is the set of non-triggered sig-
nal states. And the set of decoy states is also divided
into the part of triggered decoy states and the part of
non-triggered decoy states. For convenience, we choose
the non-triggered signal states and triggered decoy states
to derive the yield of single photons. And we require that
PTk (µ
′
A)
PT
k
(µA)
≥ PT2 (µ′A)
PT2 (µA)
≥ PT1 (µ′A)
PT1 (µA)
,
PNTk (µ
′
A)
PNT
k
(µA)
≥ PNT2 (µ′A)
PNT2 (µA)
≥ PNT1 (µ′A)
PNT1 (µA)
,
PTk (µ
′
B)
PT
k
(µB)
≥ PT2 (µ′B)
PT2 (µB)
≥ PT1 (µ′B)
PT1 (µB)
,
PNTk (µ
′
B)
PNT
k
(µB)
≥ PNT2 (µ′B)
PNT2 (µB)
≥ PNT1 (µ′B)
PNT1 (µB)
.
(20)
The convex forms of the overall triggered decoy events
and non-triggered signal events can be expressed as
Ω
(t)
µAµB = Ω˜
T
0 + P
T
1 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)ρ1 ⊗ ρ1
+PT1 (µA)ρ1 ⊗ (
∞∑
n=2
PTn (µB)|n〉〈n|)
+PT1 (µB)ρ1 ⊗ (
∞∑
m=2
PTm(µA)|m〉〈m|)
+
∞∑
n=2,m=2
PTn (µB)P
T
m(µA)|n〉〈n| ⊗ |m〉〈m|
(21)
Ω
(nt)
µ′
A
µ′
B
= Ω˜NT0 + P
NT
1 (µ
′
A)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B)ρ1 ⊗ ρ1
+PNT1 (µ
′
A)
∞∑
n=2
PNTn (µ
′
B)|n〉〈n|
+PNT1 (µ
′
B)
∞∑
m=2
PNTm (µ
′
A)|m〉〈m|
+
∞∑
n=2,m=2
PNTn (µ
′
B)P
NT
m (µ
′
A)|n〉〈n| ⊗ |m〉〈m|
(22)
where Ω˜T0 = P
T
0 (µB)Ω
T
µA0 + P
T
0 (µA)Ω
T
0µB −
PT0 (µA)P
T
0 (µB)Ω
T
00, Ω˜
NT
0 = P
NT
0 (µ
′
B)Ω
NT
µ′
A
0 +
PNT0 (µ
′
A)Ω
NT
0µ′
B
− PNT0 (µ′A)PNT0 (µ′B)ΩNT00 , ΩTµA0 and
ΩNTµA0 denote the triggered and non-triggered two-pulse
state respectively when Alice sends pulse with intensity
of µA and Bob sends vacuum pulse, Ω
T
0µB and Ω
NT
0µB
denote the triggered and non-triggered two-pulse state
respectively when Alice sends vacuum pulse and Bob
sends pulse with intensity of µA, Ω
T
00 and Ω
NT
00 denote the
triggered and non-triggered two-pulse state respectively
when Alice and Bob both send vacuum pulse. Here,
the state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 leads to the yield Y11. Applying the
same analysis as Wang’s theory[44], we can also derive a
bound on Y11 based on Eq.(21) and Eq.(22). Under the
condition that
PNT1 (µ
′
A)P
NT
2 (µ
′
B)
PT1 (µA)P
T
2 (µB)
≤ PNT2 (µ′A)PNT1 (µ′B)
PT2 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)
, Y Z11
and EX11 can be estimated by
Y Z11 ≥
PT1 (µA)P
T
2 (µB)(Q
NT
µ′
A
µ′
B
−Q˜NT0 )
PNT1 (µ
′
A
)PT1 (µA)[P
T
2 (µB)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B
)−PNT2 (µ′B)PT1 (µB)]
− P
NT
1 (µ
′
A)P
NT
2 (µ
′
B)(Q
T
µAµB
−Q˜T0 )
PNT1 (µ
′
A)P
T
1 (µA)[P
T
2 (µB)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B)−PNT2 (µ′B)PT1 (µB)]
,
(23)
EX11 ≤
ETµAµB
QTµAµB
−PT0 (µA)ET0µBQ
T
0µB
−PT0 (µB)ETµA0Q
T
µA0
PT1 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)Y11
+
PT0 (µA)P
T
0 (µB)E00Y00
PT1 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)Y11
,
(24)
where Q˜T0 = P
T
0 (µB)Q
T
µA0+P
T
0 (µA)Q
T
0µB −QT00, Q˜NT0 =
PNT0 (µ
′
B)Q
NT
µ′A0
+ PNT0 (µ
′
A)Q
NT
0µ′B
− QNT00 , QTµAµB is the
triggered gain when Alice sends pulses with intensity of
µA and Bob sends pulses with intensity of µB, Q
NT
µ′
A
µ′
B
is the non-triggered gain when Alice sends pulses with
intensity of µ′A and Bob sends pulses with intensity of
µ′B, Q
T
µA0 is the triggered overall gain when the intensity
of Alice’s source is µA and that of Bob’s source is vac-
uum. The meaning of QT0µB , Q
NT
µ′A0
and QNT0µ′B
is similar
6to QTµA0. E
T
µAµB is the overall quantum bit error rate of
triggered events in the X basis when Alice sends pulses
with intensity of µA and Bob sends pulses with intensity
of µB. E
T
0µB , E
T
µA0 and E00 is the overall quantum bit
error rate of triggered events in the X basis when Alice
and Bob send pulses with different intensities. QT00 =
PT0 (µA)P
T
0 (µB)Y00 and Q
NT
00 = P
NT
0 (µ
′
A)P
NT
0 (µ
′
B)Y00
are the gains from background noises.
Consequently, the key rate from the triggered events
of signal pulses can be given by
RT = Q˜T0 + P
T
1 (µ
′
A)P
T
1 (µ
′
B)Y
Z
11[1−H(EX11)]
−QZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
f(EZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
)H(EZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
),
(25)
where Y Z11 is the single photon yield in the Z basis, Q
Z,T
µ′Aµ
′
B
and EZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
is the overall triggered gain and quantum
bit error rate in the Z basis. The key rate from both
the triggered and non-triggered events of signal pulses is
given by
RBoth = Q˜T0 + Q˜
NT
0 + P
T
1 (µ
′
A)P
T
1 (µ
′
B)Y
Z
11[1−H(EX11)]
+PNT1 (µ
′
A)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B)Y
Z
11[1−H(EX11)]
−QZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
f(EZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
)H(EZ,Tµ′
A
µ′
B
)
−QZ,NTµ′
A
µ′
B
f(EZ,NTµ′
A
µ′
B
)H(EZ,NTµ′
A
µ′
B
),
(26)
where QZ,NTµ′Aµ′B
and EZ,NTµ′Aµ′B
is the overall gain and quantum
bit error rate of non-triggered events in the Z basis.
After all, the final secret key rate of the modified pas-
sive three-intensity decoy-state protocol is given by
R = max{RT , RBoth}. (27)
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we numerically compare the perfor-
mance for the phase-encoded MDI-QKD scheme us-
ing the active three-intensity decoy-state protocol, pas-
sive two-intensity decoy-state protocol and modified pas-
sive three-intensity decoy-state protocol. The numeri-
cal parameters used are listed in Table I. It should
be noted that all these parameters are the same as
Ref.([29, 32, 41]) for well comparison. The parameters
for SPDCS are borrowed from the experiment by Wang
et al.[54, 57], i.e. dA = dB = 5 × 10(−5), ηA = ηB = 0.4
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in the simu-
lations: α is the loss coefficient of the channel(fiber), f is the
error correction inefficiency, ηD is the detection efficiency of
the relay, eD is the errors due to channel relative-phase mis-
alignment between Alice and Bob, pd is the background dark
count rate of the detector in the relay.
α(dB/km) f ηD ed pd
0.20 1.16 0.145 0.015 3× 10(−6)
and P corµA = P
cor
µB = 0.405844. For fair comparison, dif-
ferent decoy-state protocols either for WCS and SPDCS
apply the following key rate formula
R = Q0 +Q
Z
11(1−H(EX11))
−QZµAµBf(EZµAµB )H(EZµAµB )
(28)
where Q0 = P0(µA)Q
X
0µB + P0(µB)Q
X
µA0 −
P0(µA)P0(µB)Y00. Note that a successful events in
the relay need responses from two detectors, thus
Y00 = pd
2. QX11 and E
X
11 subject to different constraints
for different decoy-state protocols given the measured
values of overall gain and QBER in a certain experiment.
For MDI-QKD using SPDCS, since no experiment has
been reported up to now, we can not obtain the experi-
mental data about the overall gain and QBER. However,
we can theoretically estimate them and a stringent
evaluation of the overall gain and QBER with full
phase randomization is shown in Appendix A. For the
third part on the right hand of Eq.(28), the calculation
formulas of QZµAµB and E
Z
µAµB for SPDCS are given in
Appendix B following the way of Ma’s method[32]. It
should be noted that, for the ideal infinite decoy-state
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Key rate comparison for phase-
encoded MDI-QKD using WCS and SPDCS. The setup pa-
rameters are listed in Table I. The dotted curve, obtained
from Eq.(28,29), represents the infinite decoy-state protocol
using SPDCS with PND given by Eq.(5) The dash-dotted
curve, obtained from Eq.(28) and Eq.(2-7) in Ref.([41], repre-
sents the infinite decoy-state protocol using WCS). The solid
curve, obtained from Eq.(23,24,25,26,27), represents the mod-
ified passive three-intensity decoy protocol using SPDCS with
PND given by Eq.(9,10), where the intensities are chosen
by uA = uB = 147.577 × 10
−3, P corµA = P
cor
µB
= 0.12 and
u′A = u
′
B = 623.927 × 10
−3, P corµ′
A
= P corµ′
B
= 0.1. The dashed
curve represents the active three-intensity decoy protocol us-
ing WCS, which is obtained from Eq.(6,7,28), where the in-
tensities are chosen by uA = uB = 0.2 and u
′
A = u
′
B = 0.5.
The related formulas for overall gain and QBER can be found
in appendix A and appendix B.
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FIG. 3: A comparison for the probability of emitting different
number of photons between heralded SPDCS and WCS. Here,
P corx = 0.405844 and µx = 1.425× 10
−3 for the SPDCS while
the intensity is 0.5 for the WCS.
protocol, QZ11 and E
X
11 are given by[41]
QZ11 = P1(µA)P1(µB)(1− pd)2[η
c
Aη
c
B
2−(2ηcA + 3ηcB − 3ηcAηcB)pd + 4(1− ηcA)(1 − ηcB)pd2]
EX11 = e0 − (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2 P1(µA)P1(µB)η
c
Aη
c
B
2QX11
(29)
In Fig.2, we compare the performance of phase-
encoded MDI-QKD using WCS and SPDCS. The dot-
ted curve is with SPDCS and dash-dotted curve is with
WCS. Both of them are conducted under the ideal in-
finite decoy-state protocol and the optimal intensity is
selected at each value of transmission distance. The
solid curve is conducted under the modified passive three-
intensity decoy-state protocol and the dashed curve is ob-
tained under the active three-intensity decoy-state pro-
tocol. From Fig.2, it can be seen that the phase-encoded
MDI-QKD using SPDCS performs better both in trans-
mission distance and key generation rate than the one
using WCS. Our results show that SPDCS shall be su-
perior in the near-future experiment of phase-encoded
MDI-QKD. This is because the fraction of single photon
for the heralded SPDCS is bigger than that for the WCS.
For example, the probability of single photon for the dis-
tribution shown in Eq.(5) is 0.3784 when P corx = 0.405844
and µx = 1.425× 10−3. But that for the Poisson distri-
bution is 0.3033 when the intensity of WCS is 0.5. For
better interpret this fact, we take a simple comparison
in Fig.3. Besides, from our simulation, one can find that
the modified passive three-intensity decoy-state protocol
and active three-intensity decoy-state protocol are both
close to the ideal infinite decoy-state protocol, which im-
plies they are so efficient that can be used in practical
experiment.
In Fig.4, we compare the key generation rate of the
modified passive three-intensity decoy-state protocol, ac-
tive three-intensity decoy-state protocol and passive two-
intensity decoy-state protocol while practical SPDCS are
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Key rate comparison among the
modified passive three-intensity decoy-state protocol, active
three-intensity decoy-state protocol and passive two-intensity
decoy-state protocol for MDI-QKD using practical SPDCS.
The setup parameters are listed in Table I. The solid and
dotted curve are plotted the same as Fig.2. The dash-
dotted curve, which is obtained from Eq.(6,7,28), represents
the active three-intensity decoy protocol using SPDCS with
PND given by Eq.(5), where the intensities are chosen by
uA = uB = 0.577 × 10
−3, P corµA = P
cor
µB
= 0.432837 and u′A =
u′B = 1.425 × 10
−3, P corµ′
A
= P corµ′
B
= 0.405844. The dashed
curve, plotted referring to Eq.(13,16,17,18,19), denotes the
passive two-intensity decoy-state protocol using SPDCS with
PND given by Eq.(9,10), where the intensities are chosen
by uA = uB = 0.577 × 10
−3, P corµA = P
cor
µB
= 0.432837 and
u′A = u
′
B = 790 × 10
−3, P corµ′
A
= P corµ′
B
= 0.1. The related for-
mulas for overall gain and QBER can be found in appendix
A and appendix B.
used in MDI-QKD. From Fig.4, the first two proto-
cols perform better than the third one and are more
close to the ideal infinite decoy-state protocol. The re-
sult comes from the inefficient estimation of single pho-
ton contribution and single photon error in passive two-
intensity decoy-state protocol. Most importantly, by
introducing one more intensity, our improved passive
protocol(the modified passive three-intensity decoy-state
protocol) can perform better in transmission distance and
key generation rate than the active three-intensity decoy-
state protocol. This is resulted from the fact that, com-
bining the events from pulses of another intensity (active
decoy sate) and those from non-triggered pulses, our es-
timations for the single photon yield and error rate are
more stringent.
VII. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION
In real-life situations, one cannot generate an infinite
number of signals in a reasonable experimental time.
8Thus the effect of finite data-set size, which will induce
statistical fluctuation, shall be included in parameter es-
timation. In this paper, we apply a rough finite-key anal-
ysis based on the standard statistical analysis[61] and
a rigorous analysis might be considered in our future
work. With standard error analysis using essentially nor-
mal distributions[41], we take a upper and lower bound
to characterize the statistical fluctuations of the overall
gain and quantum bit error rate, which are given by
QˆωµAµB (1 − βq) ≤ QωµAµB ≤ QˆωµAµB (1 + βq)
EˆωµAµB Qˆ
ω
µAµB (1− βeq) ≤ QωµAµBEωµAµB
≤ EˆωµAµB QˆωµAµB (1 + βeq)
(30)
where QˆωµAµB and Eˆ
ω
µAµB are measurement outcomes
in the ω basis, which can be theoretically estimated
in appendix A in our paper. The fluctuation ratio βq
and βeq satisfy βq = nα/
√
NωµAµB Qˆ
ω
µAµB and βeq =
nα/
√
NωµAµB Qˆ
ω
µAµBE
ω
µAµB . Here, N
ω
µAµB is the number
of pulses, in the ω basis, sent out by Alice and Bob when
they choose intensities µA and µB respectively; nα is the
number of standard deviations one chooses for statisti-
cal fluctuation analysis, which is related to the failure
probability of the security analysis. Take nα = 5 for an
example, which represents that the failure probability is
5.73× 10−7.
If we consider the modified passive three-intensity
decoy-state protocol, the bound on the single-photon
yield and error rate should be rewritten by
Y Z11 ≥ Y Z11
≡
PT1 (µA)P
T
2 (µB)(Q
NT
µ′
A
µ′
B
−Q˜NT0 )
PNT1 (µ
′
A
)PT1 (µA)[P
T
2 (µB)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B
)−PNT2 (µ′B)PT1 (µB)]
− P
NT
1 (µ
′
A)P
NT
2 (µ
′
B)(Q
T
µAµB
−Q˜T0 )
PNT1 (µ
′
A)P
T
1 (µA)[P
T
2 (µB)P
NT
1 (µ
′
B)−PNT2 (µ′B)PT1 (µB)]
,
(31)
EX11 ≤ EX11
≡
ETµAµB
QTµAµB
−PT0 (µA)ET0µBQ
T
0µB
−PT0 (µB)ETµA0Q
T
µA0
PT1 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)Y
Z
11
+
PT0 (µA)P
T
0 (µB)E00Y00
PT1 (µA)P
T
1 (µB)Y
Z
11
,
(32)
where
QTµAµB = Q
T
µAµB (1 +
nα√
NTµAµB
QTµAµB
),
QNTµ′Aµ′B
= QNTµ′Aµ′B
(1− nα√
NNT
µ′
A
µ′
B
QNT
µ′
A
µ′
B
),
ETµAµBQ
T
µAµB = E
T
µAµBQ
T
µAµB (1 +
nα√
NTµAµB
QTµAµB
ETµAµB
),
ET0µBQ
T
0µB = E
T
0µBQ
T
0µB (1 − nα√NT0µBQT0µBET0µB
),
ETµA0Q
T
µA0 = E
T
µA0Q
T
µA0(1− nα√NTµA0QTµA0ETµA0
).
(33)
In the above equations, Q˜T0 = P
T
0 (µB)Q
T
µA0 +
PT0 (µA)Q
T
0µB − QT00, Q˜NT0 = PNT0 (µ′B)QNTµ′A0 +
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Key rate of MDI-QKD with statistical
fluctuation under the modified passive three-intensity decoy-
state protocol. The setup parameters are listed in Table I.
The solid curve is plotted the same as Fig.2. The dashed curve
is obtained from Eq.(31,32,25,26,27) for our modified passive
three-intensity decoy-state protocol with different length of
data N . The related formulas for overall gain and QBER can
be found in appendix A and appendix B. In the simulations,
we assume that five standard deviations (nα = 5) are used.
PNT0 (µ
′
A)Q
NT
0µ′B
− QNT00 ; QTµA0 = QTµA0(1 − nα√NTµA0QTµA0
),
QT0µB = Q
T
0µB (1 − nα√NT0µBQT0µB
), QNTµ′
A
0 = Q
NT
µ′
A
0(1 +
nα√
NNT
µ′
A
0
QNT
µ′
A
0
), QNT0µ′
B
= QNT0µ′B
(1 + nα√
NNT
0µ′
B
QNT
0µ′
B
); NTµAµB ,
NTµA0 andN
T
0µB denote the number of the triggered pulses
when Alice and Bob choose intensities of {µAµB}, {µA0},
and {0µB} respectively. NNTµ′
A
µ′
B
, NNTµ′
A
0 and N
NT
0µ′
B
denote
the number of the non-triggered pulses when Alice and
Bob choose intensities of {µ′Aµ′B}, {µ′A0}, and {0µ′B} re-
spectively.
Substituting Eq.(31) and Eq.(32) into Eq.(25) and
Eq.(26), we can estimate the secret key rate with data
under statistical fluctuation, which is shown in Fig.5.
In the simulations, we choose standard deviations with
nα = 5 and the length of pulses is assumed to be
the same for each pair of intensities of Alice and Bob.
Particularly, if we define NµAµB , Nµ′Aµ′B , NµA0, Nµ′A0,
N0µB and N0µ′B as the number of pulses when Alice and
Bob choose different intensities and assume NµAµB =
Nµ′
A
µ′
B
= NµA0 = Nµ′A0 = N0µB = N0µ′B , N , then
the unknown variables in Eq.(31) and Eq.(32) can be ob-
tained by NTµAµB = ηAηBN , N
NT
µ′
A
µ′
B
= (1−ηA)(1−ηB)N ,
NTµA0 = ηAdBN , N
NT
µ′
A
0 = (1 − ηA)(1 − dB)N , NT0µB =
dAηBN and N
NT
0µ′
B
= (1−dA)(1−ηB)N . From Fig.5, one
can clearly find that the finite length of the raw key will
obviously compromise the secret key rate of our protocol
and large number of signals is required for preferable se-
9cret key being shared by two parties at a long distance.
A rigorous finite-key analysis for our protocol requires
further study.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we put forward two passive decoy-state
protocol for MDI-QKD using practical SPDCS and an-
alyze the performance of it under different decoy-state
protocols. From numerical simulation, we remark that
the MDI-QKD using practical SPDCS performs better
than the one using WCS. Furthermore, we conclude that
the modified passive three-intensity decoy-state protocol
we proposed is close to the ideal infinite decoy-state pro-
tocol and shall be as a choice for the practical experiment
of MDI-QKD using SPDCS.
For a complete security analysis, issues like the finite
key effect, intensity fluctuation and modulator imperfec-
tion, must also be considered. Curty et al.[43] recently
gives a complete and rigorous finite-key analysis on MDI-
QKD using WCS. It will be attractive to analyze these
issues for the MDI-QKD using practical SPDCS. In this
paper, we assume the devices and transmission distance
are the same for the two senders. It is interesting to have
a research on the case when two source settings are dif-
ferent and recent study by Xu et al.[62] has an important
progress about this issue.
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APPENDIX A: OVERALL QUANTUM BIT GAIN
AND QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE WITH
FULL PHASE RANDOMIZATION
In practical fiber-based QKD experiment, the overall
gain and error rate can be directly measured. However,
in this appendix, we shall give their theoretical evalu-
ation for simulation purpose. In what follows, we will
evaluate the overall gain and QBER for the PND under
the condition that the detector is triggered or not trig-
gered. We shall consider the case when the signal states
emitted from the SPDCS are phase-randomized.
First of all, note the fact that the degree of influence
of fibre loss on the transmitted mixed state is different
for different type of PND, we shall characterize how fibre
loss affects the transmitted mixed state under a practical
PND. Interestingly, the basic setup of one type of PND
passing through a beam splitter can be introduced to
characterize this influence. In this scenario, as shown in
Mode: a
Mode: b
Beam Splitter
Vacuum
FIG. 6: Diagram of basic setup for a photon-number distri-
bution passing through a beams splitter with transmittancy
of η
Fig.6 when one state with number distribution of Pn(µ)
passing through a beam splitter with transmittancy η,
the photon-number distribution Pn,m(µ) of events having
n photons in output mode a and m photons in output
mode b is a Bernoulli transform of the distribution Pn(µ)
about η, that is,
Pn,m(µ) = Cmn+mPn+m(µ)η
n(1 − η)m. (A1)
In particular, when one ignores the output of mode b,
the conditional photon-number distribution Pn(µ, η) of
output mode a is the total probability over all region of
m, which can be expressed as
Pn(µ, η) =
∞∑
m=0
Pn,m(µ)
=
∞∑
m=0
Cmn+mPn+m(µ)η
n(1 − η)m.
(A2)
With mathematical Taylor expansion, it is easy to prove
that the equation α−n−1 =
∞∑
m=0
(1− α)mCmn+m always
holds true for any real number 0 < α < 1. Thus,
for a thermal photon-number distribution with Pn(µ) =
µn
(1+µ)n+1 , the number distribution after the beams split-
ter is
Pn(µ, η) =
(µη)n
(1+µη)n+1 . (A3)
Under this method, we can obtain the formalization of
the triggered mixed state, given by Eq.(3)and Eq.(4),
after passing through the quantum channel with trans-
10
mittancy of ηcA(η
c
B)for Alice(Bob), that is
|ψ(µx, θx, ηcx) 〉x
=
√
P corµx
Ppostµx
( 1+dx1+µxηcx
− 11+µx(ηcx+ηx−ηxηcx) ) + (1− P corµx ) |0〉
+
∞∑
n=1
√
P corµx
Ppostµx
Fn(µx, ηcx)e
inθx |n〉
with
Fn(µx, η
c
x) =
(1+dx)(µxη
c
x)
n
(1+µxηcx)
n+1 − [µxη
c
x(1−ηx)]n
[1+µx(ηcx+ηx−ηxηcx)]n+1
,
(A4)
where x = A or x = B.
Alice and Bob prepare the following heralded mixed
states with intensities µA and µB respectively before
phase randomization
|ψ(µA, θA) 〉A|ψ(µB , θB) 〉B. (A5)
Emitted from the sources, the joint photon state are split
by 50:50 beam splitters, labeled by r and s, and transmit-
ted through the lossy channel. Then, the state arrived at
the relay can be described by∣∣∣ψ(µA, θA, ηcA2 ) 〉
Ar
∣∣∣ψ(µA, θA + φA, ηcA2 ) 〉
As
⊗
∣∣∣ψ(µB , θB, ηcB2 ) 〉
Br
∣∣∣ψ(µB , θB + φB , ηcB2 ) 〉
Bs
.
(A6)
where φA and φB are the encoded information of phase
that Alice and Bob want to apply. After going through
the beam splitters in the relay, the above state will be
transformed into the following partial Bell-state measure-
ment detection modes r0, r1, r2 and r3.∣∣∣ 1√
2
ψ(µA, θA,
ηcA
2 ) +
1√
2
ψ(µB, θB,
ηcB
2 )
〉
r0
⊗
∣∣∣ 1√
2
ψ(µA, θA,
ηcA
2 )− 1√2ψ(µB , θB,
ηcB
2 )
〉
r1
⊗
∣∣∣ 1√
2
ψ(µA, θA + φA,
ηcA
2 ) +
1√
2
ψ(µB , θB + φB ,
ηcB
2 )
〉
s0
⊗
∣∣∣ 1√
2
ψ(µA, θA + φA,
ηcA
2 )− 1√2ψ(µB , θB + φB ,
ηcB
2 )
〉
s1
.
(A7)
In what follows, we shall calculate the detection prob-
abilities for these four detectors. For simplification, we
denote
a0 = 1− P corµA
+
P corµA
PpostµA
( 1+dA1+0.5µAηcA
− 11+µA(0.5ηcA+ηA−0.5ηAηcA) )
b0 = 1− P corµB
+
P corµB
PpostµB
( 1+dB1+0.5µBηcB
− 11+µB(0.5ηcB+ηB−0.5ηBηcB) )
an =
P corµA
PpostµA
Fn(µA,
ηcA
2 )
=
P corµA
PpostµA
{ (1+dA)(
µAη
c
A
2 )
n
(1+
µAη
c
A
2 )
n+1 −
[
µAη
c
A
2 (1−ηA)
]n
[
1+µA(
ηc
A
2 +ηA−
ηAη
c
A
2 )
]n+1 }
bn =
P corµB
PpostµB
Fn(µB,
ηcB
2 )
=
P corµB
PpostµB
{ (1+dB)(
µBη
c
B
2 )
n
(1+
µBη
c
B
2 )
n+1 −
[
µBη
c
B
2 (1−ηB)
]n
[
1+µB(
ηc
B
2 +ηB−
ηBη
c
B
2 )
]n+1 }
(A8)
Let
√
T0 =
√
a0
2 +
√
b0
2 and
√
K0 =
√
a0
2 −
√
b0
2 . Then,
Eq.(A7) can be expressed as
[
√
T0 |0〉+
∞∑
n=1
(
√
an
2 e
inθA +
√
bn
2 e
inθB ) |n〉]r0
⊗[√K0 |0〉+
∞∑
n=1
(
√
an
2 e
inθA −
√
bn
2 e
inθB ) |n〉]r1
⊗[√T0 |0〉+
∞∑
n=1
(
√
an
2 e
in(θA+φA) +
√
bn
2 e
in(θB+φB)) |n〉]r2
⊗[√K0 |0〉+
∞∑
n=1
(
√
an
2 e
in(θA+φA) −
√
bn
2 e
in(θB+φB)) |n〉]r3
(A9)
Suppose the properties of the four detectors are the same
and let ηD and pd denote their detection efficiency and
dark count rate respectively. Therefore, for an incoming
n-photon states, the probability of at least one photon
being detected can be described by
Dn = pd + (1− pd)[1 − (1− ηD)n]
= 1− (1− pd)(1 − ηD)n. (A10)
Thus the detection probabilities for the four detectors are
given by
Dr0 = |
√
T0 |2pd
+
∞∑
n=1
{[an2 + bn2 +
√
anbn cos (n∆θ)]Dn},
Dr1 = |
√
K0 |2pd
+
∞∑
n=1
{[an2 + bn2 −
√
anbn cos (n∆θ)]Dn},
Ds0 = |
√
T0 |2pd
+
∞∑
n=1
{[an2 + bn2 +
√
anbn cosn(∆θ +∆φ)]Dn]},
Ds1 = |
√
K0 |2pd
+
∞∑
n=1
{[an2 + bn2 −
√
anbn cosn(∆θ +∆φ)]Dn]}.
(A11)
where ∆θ = θA − θB and ∆φ = φA − φB .
In actual experiments of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) ef-
fect [63] happened in the relay, it is assumed that the
single photons entered the 50:50 beam splitter are iden-
tical. This can make sure there are no unwanted errors
when both single photons are prepared under the same
basis. Thus, in this paper, we assume Alice’s devices
and Bob’s have identical performance, which guarantees
indistinguishable photons will be generated from two in-
dependent practical SPDC sources and stable HOM in-
terference will be observed in the relay. That is to say,
we shall assume µA = µB, P
cor
µA = P
cor
µB , P
post
µA = P
post
µB ,
dA = dB and ηA = ηB . For better simulation perfor-
mance, although always not the case in practical MDI-
QKD experiments, we also assume the channel transmit-
tances between sources and detectors are identical, i.e.,
ηcA = η
c
B. Here, η
c
A = 10
−αlAC/10 and ηcB = 10
−αlBC/10.
In the above Equation, α denotes the loss coefficient, lAC
(lBC) denotes the length of the fiber between Alice(Bob)
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and Charlie. Under the above condition, it can be ob-
tained that a0 = b0 and an = bn for n ≥ 1. Therefore,
Eq.(A11) can be quantified by
Dr0 = 2a0pd +
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w)
+x(1+dA)2(1+x) [
1
(1+x)ei∆θ−x +
ei∆θ
1+x−xei∆θ ]
− v(1+dA)(1−pd)2(1+x) [ 1(1+x)ei∆θ−v + e
i∆θ
1+x−vei∆θ ]
− u2z [ 1zei∆θ−u + e
i∆θ
z−uei∆θ ]
+w(1−pd)2z [
1
zei∆θ−w +
ei∆θ
z−wei∆θ ]},
(A12)
Dr1 =
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w)
−x(1+dA)2(1+x) [ 1(1+x)ei∆θ−x + e
i∆θ
1+x−xei∆θ ]
+ v(1+dA)(1−pd)2(1+x) [
1
(1+x)ei∆θ−v +
ei∆θ
1+x−vei∆θ ]
+ u2z [
1
zei∆θ−u +
ei∆θ
z−uei∆θ ]
−w(1−pd)2z [ 1zei∆θ−w + e
i∆θ
z−wei∆θ ]},
(A13)
Ds0 = 2a0pd +
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w)
+x(1+dA)2(1+x) [
1
(1+x)ei(∆θ+∆φ)−x +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
1+x−xei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
− v(1+dA)(1−pd)2(1+x) [ 1(1+x)ei(∆θ+∆φ)−v +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
1+x−vei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
− u2z [ 1zei(∆θ+∆φ)−u +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
z−uei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
+w(1−pd)2z [
1
zei(∆θ+∆φ)−w +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
z−wei(∆θ+∆φ) ]},
(A14)
Ds1 =
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w)
−x(1+dA)2(1+x) [ 1(1+x)ei(∆θ+∆φ)−x +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
1+x−xei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
+ v(1+dA)(1−pd)2(1+x) [
1
(1+x)ei(∆θ+∆φ)−v +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
1+x−vei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
+ u2z [
1
zei(∆θ+∆φ)−u +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
z−uei(∆θ+∆φ) ]
−w(1−pd)2z [ 1zei(∆θ+∆φ)−w +
ei(∆θ+∆φ)
z−wei(∆θ+∆φ) ]},
(A15)
where x =
µAη
c
A
2 , z = 1+x+µAηA−xηA, u = x(1−ηA),
v = x(1− ηD) and w = u(1− ηD) = v(1− ηA). Note the
fact that ∆φ = 0, π when Alice and Bob choose the same
basis, we take the integral of ∆θ for Eq.(A12), Eq.(A13),
Eq.(A14) and Eq.(A15). Then, we obtain
Dr0 = Ds0 = 2a0pd +
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w) − (1+dA)pd2(1+x) + pd2z },
Dr1 = Ds1 =
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w) + (1+dA)pd2(1+x) − pd2z }.
(A16)
As is proved by Ma et al.[41], the gain QµAµB is given
by
QµAµB = [Dr0(1 −Dr1) + (1−Dr0)Dr1 ][Ds0(1−Ds1)
+(1−Ds0)Ds1 ].
(A17)
We substitute Eq.(A16) into Eq.(A17) and obtain
QµAµB = [C0 + 2PC1 − 2C0P (C1 − C2)
−2P 2(C12 − C22)]2, (A18)
with
C0 = 2a0pd,
P =
P corµA
PpostµA
,
C1 =
x(1+dA)
1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD) − uz(z−u) +
w(1−pd)
z(z−w) ,
C2 =
pd
2z − (1+dA)pd2(1+x) .
(A19)
For the case when µA = 0 and µB 6= 0, the calculation
formula for Q0µB is an exception of the above Eq.(A19).
In that case, Eq.(A11) changes to
Dr0 = Ds0 =
1
2{| (
√
a0 +
√
b0) |2pd +
∞∑
n=1
{bnDn}},
Dr1 = Ds1 =
1
2{| (
√
a0 −
√
b0) |2pd +
∞∑
n=1
{bnDn}}.
(A20)
Here, a0 = 1 and b0 =
P corµB
PpostµB
( 1+dB1+0.5µBηcB
−
1
1+µB(0.5ηcB+ηB−0.5ηBηcB) ) + (1 − P
cor
µB ). With a simple
mathematical computation, we can obtain
Dr0 = Ds0 =
1
2 | (1 +
√
b0) |2pd + P
cor
µB
2PpostµB
{x(1+dB)1+x
− v(1+dB)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD) − uz(z−u) +
w(1−pd)
z(z−w) },
Dr1 = Ds1 =
1
2 | (1 −
√
b0) |2pd + P
cor
µB
2PpostµB
{x(1+dB)1+x
− v(1+dB)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD) − uz(z−u) +
w(1−pd)
z(z−w) }.
(A21)
Therefore, we can obtain Q0µB according to Eq.(A17).
QµA0 can be calculated under the same way.
The intrinsic error rate, resulted form the background
noise and multi-photon states, is given by [41]
E′µAµBQµAµB = 2Dr0(1−Dr1)(1 −Ds1)Ds0 . (A22)
Considering the relative-phase distortion errors, we can
obtain the averaged quantum bit error rate
EµAµB = E
′
µAµB + ed(1−
EµAµB
e0
). (A23)
where ed denotes errors from the channel relative-phase
misalignment and e0 = 0.5 is the error rate of a back-
ground noise.
Using the same method, we can also evaluate the over-
all gain and QBER for the triggered events and non-
triggered events while taking the passive one intensity
decoy-state protocol into account. For the photon num-
ber distribution of PTn (µx) and P
T
n (µx) (x = AorB), we
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can obtain the detection probabilities of four detectors
by Eq.(A11), and further evaluate the overall gain by
Eq.(A17) and QBER by Eq.(A22) and Eq.(A23). Taking
the non-triggered events for an example, the probabilities
of four detectors for detecting the non-triggered events
are given by
DNTr0 = D
NT
s0 = 2a
NT
0 pd + P
cor
µA { vdA(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD) − dAx1+x
+ uz(z−u) − w(1−pd)z(z−w) + dApd2(1+x) − pd2z },
DNTr1 = D
NT
s1 = P
cor
µA { vdA(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD) − dAx1+x
+ uz(z−u) − w(1−pd)z(z−w) − dApd2(1+x) + pd2z },
(A24)
where aNT0 =
1−P corµA
2 + P
cor
µA (
1
1+µA(0.5ηcA+ηA−0.5ηAηcA) −
dA
1+0.5µAηcA
). Then, in Eq.(A17), replace Dr0 , Ds0 , Dr1
and Dr1 by D
NT
r0 , D
NT
s0 , D
NT
r1 and D
NT
r1 respectively and
we can obtain Q
(nt)
µAµB . Similar to the calculation of Q0µB ,
QµA0, and EµAµB , we can also evaluate Q
(nt)
0µB
, Q
(nt)
µA0
, and
E
(nt)
µAµB .
APPENDIX B: OVERALL GAIN AND QBER IN
THE RECTILINEAR BASIS
In appendix B, we will show how to calculate the over-
all gain and quantum bit error rate in the Z-basis, which
is discussed in the paper by Ma et al[41]. In the recti-
linear basis, both of the senders only choose one of the
two r and s modes. Thus, the overall gain are divided
into two parts: the gain Q
(C)
Z from events that Alice and
Bob choose the different modes, and the gain Q
(E)
Z from
errors that Alice and Bob choose the same mode and a
successful two-click event occurs. Therefore, the overall
gain in the Z-basis is given by
QZ = Q
(C)
Z +Q
(E)
Z . (B1)
In what follows, we shall discuss how to calculate Q
(C)
Z
and Q
(E)
Z . Since either Alice or Bob only choose one
of the mode, the state fully passing the BS in sender’s
side without a transmittancy of 1/2. Then, after pass-
ing through the channel, the state arrives at the BS in
the relay has less 1/2 times of channel transmittancy.
And most importantly, now there exists no interference
between two sender’s states. So the gain Q
(C)
Z is given
by
Q
(C)
Z = 2(1−D(ZA)r1 )(1 −D(ZB)s1 )D(ZA)r1 D(ZB)s1 , (B2)
where
D
(ZA)
r1 = a0pd +
P corµA
PpostµA
{x(1+dA)1+x − v(1+dA)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w) },
D
(ZB)
s1 = b0pd +
P corµB
PpostµB
{x(1+dB)1+x − v(1+dB)(1−pd)(1+x)(1+xηD)
− uz(z−u) + w(1−pd)z(z−w) }.
(B3)
The calculation of gain from errors is slightly more
complex. One of the error events is that Alice and Bob
both choose r mode. In this case, two photon interference
occurs in the BS at the relay of r mode. The detection
probability of detector r0 and r1 can be calculated by
Eq.(A11). But the probability that one of the two de-
tectors in the s mode responses is given by pd(1 − pd).
Thus, the formula for calculating Q
(E)
Z is shown as the
following
Q
(E)
Z = 2pd(1− pd)D(Z
′)
r0 (1−D(Z
′)
r1 ), (B4)
where
D
(Z′)
r0 = 2a
′
0pd +
P corµA
PpostµA
{x′(1+dA)1+x′ − v
′(1+dA)(1−pd)
(1+x′)(1+x′ηD)
− u′z′(z′−u′) + w
′(1−pd)
z′(z′−w′) − (1+dA)pd2(1+x′) + pd2z′ },
D
(Z′)
r1 =
P corµA
PpostµA
{x′(1+dA)1+x′ − v
′(1+dA)(1−pd)
(1+x′)(1+x′ηD)
− u′z′(z′−u′) + w
′(1−pd)
z′(z′−w′) +
(1+dA)pd
2(1+x′) − pd2z′ },
(B5)
with a′0 = 1−P corµA +
P corµA
PpostµA
( 1+dA1+µAηcA
− 11+µA(ηcA+ηA−ηAηcA) ),
x′ = µAηcA, z
′ = 1 + x′ + µAηA − x′ηA, u′ = x′(1 − ηA),
v′ = x′(1− ηD) and w′ = u′(1 − ηD) = v′(1− ηA).
For the calculation of quantum bit error rate, taking
additional misalignment errors into account, we obtain
EZQZ = edQ
(C)
Z + (1− ed)Q(E)Z . (B6)
The overall gain and QBER under Z-basis for the
triggered events and non-triggered events in the passive
one intensity decoy-stated protocol can be obtained in
the same way. However, one should consider the pho-
ton number distribution shown as Eq.(9,10) other than
Eq.(5).
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